Let\u27s Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital Age by Blake, Scott D.
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 5 Issue 2 Article 7 
5-1-2010 
Let's Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital 
Age 
Scott D. Blake 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott D. Blake, Let's Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital Age, 5 Seventh Circuit 
Rev. 491 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/7 
This Fourth Amendment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly 
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
 
LET’S BE REASONABLE: 




SCOTT D. BLAKE∗ 
 
Cite as: Scott D. Blake, Let’s Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the 





 A police officer comes to your house, knocks on your door, 
and presents you with a search warrant. The warrant authorizes the 
officer to search your house for any evidence of illegal drug activity. 
This includes any physical evidence, such as drugs, pipes, syringes, 
cash, or storage containers, as well as any computers that may store 
incriminating digital files.1 During the search, the officer discovers a 
substantial amount of marijuana, baggies, a scale, and other drug 
paraphernalia.2 The officer also seizes your laptop and takes it back to 
the police station so its contents can be examined.3 
 The following week, a police detective begins to search the 
laptop. First, he makes an exact copy of your hard drive to prevent any 
files from being destroyed.4 Next, the detective uses a sophisticated 
software program that organizes every file on your laptop and creates 
a directory, which he proceeds to examine.5 After opening dozens of 
                                                 
 
* J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2009).  
2 See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999).  
3 See id.  
4 See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1083–84.  
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innocent files, the officer opens a folder that contains hundreds of JPG 
image files.6 He opens the first file that reveals a picture of a young 
boy, naked and posing for the camera.7 The officer makes a notation, 
but moves forward with his original search for drug-related activity.8 
His subsequent search reveals more photos of child pornography, as 
well as other incriminating drug-related files. The police then arrest 
you and charge you for both the sale of marijuana and possession of 
child pornography.  
 This factual scenario is very similar to a number of cases 
playing out in the federal circuits involving the inadvertent discovery 
of illegal files that are outside the scope of the warrant during a 
computer search.9 Defendants typically challenge the admissibility of 
this type of evidence in a motion to suppress arguing that the search 
and seizure was beyond the scope of the original warrant.10 On the 
other hand, prosecutors and law enforcement argue that this type of 
evidence is admissible because it falls under the plain view doctrine.11   
Courts have wrestled over whether inadvertently discovered 
computer files are properly admissible under the plain view doctrine, 
or whether they are inadmissible because the search and seizure was 
beyond the scope of the original warrant.12 A majority of federal 
circuits, including the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mann,13 
have extended traditional Fourth Amendment warrant doctrine to the 
realm of digital evidence.14 These courts base their analyses on three 
                                                 
6 See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (E.D. Va. 1999).  
7 See id.  
8 See Mann, 592 F.3d at 781.  
9 See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 514 (4th Cir. 2010); Mann, 592 
F.3d at 782; United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999); Gray, 78 
F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
10 See id.  
11 See Williams, 592 F.3d at 519; Mann, 592 F.3d at 782. 
12 See Williams, 592 F.3d at 514; Mann, 592 F.3d at 782; Carey, 172 F.3d at 
1271; Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
13 592 F.3d at 786. 
 14 See generally Williams, 592 F.3d 511; United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 
1078 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miranda, 325 F. App’x. 858 (11th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Henson, 848 
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foundations of Fourth Amendment doctrine: reasonableness, the 
particularity requirement, and the plain view doctrine.15  
In contrast, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits question whether 
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine sufficiently protects privacy 
rights in the digital age.16 In response, both Circuits have deviated 
from traditional Fourth Amendment principles.17 The Ninth Circuit 
has advocated a multi-step prophylactic approach in order to prevent 
overbroad searches, and the Tenth Circuit determines whether the 
search has exceeded the scope of the warrant by looking at the 
subjective intent of the executing officer.18  
Both of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ deviations are premature 
and create just as many issues as they solve. They are premature 
because traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine has proved to be 
workable in digital evidence cases. Over time, the contours of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine will evolve along with developments in 
computer technology. The divergence is also impractical because it 
would act as a constitutional straitjacket on law enforcement working 
the field and would create two systems of search and seizure law—one 
for physical evidence and one for digital evidence. These two 
approaches are unnecessary because traditional Fourth Amendment 
doctrine provides sufficient constitutional protection to individuals and 
will evolve as technology develops or possible constitutional 
intrusions later arise.   
 
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE: TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
 
In order to fully understand the issue before the Seventh 
Circuit in United States v. Mann, it is important to understand 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
15 See id.  
16 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006–
07 (9th Cir. 2009); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273–76. 
17 See id.  
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traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine. The starting point for this 
analysis is the language of the Fourth Amendment itself, which states:  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.19 
 
Since the text clearly indicates that individuals are protected from any 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,”20 the Supreme Court has held 
that reasonableness is the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment 
analysis.21 Drawing a clear line between a reasonable and 
unreasonable search is difficult; therefore, courts must examine and 
balance the totality of the circumstances.22 A search’s reasonableness 
“is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”23 For example, in Polston v. State, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas upheld a state statute that subjected convicted felons to 
mandatory DNA testing.24  The court held that the statute was 
reasonable because the felons’ privacy interests were outweighed by 
both the state’s interest in having an accurate criminal justice system 
and an interest in preventing and solving future crimes.25  
                                                 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
20 Id.   
21 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 359 (1967).   
22 United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) (holding that the Court has 
“treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template 
is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a 
given case”).   
23 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).  
24 201 S.W.3d 406, 407–08 (Ark. 2005).    
25 Id. at 410–11 (“As to the felon’s expectation of privacy, the United States 
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A. General Searches are Unreasonable 
 
General searches are per se unreasonable.26 The Fourth 
Amendment aims to protect individual privacy rights by preventing 
law enforcement from conducting general searches that result in a 
rummaging through an individual’s property until something 
incriminating is found.27 In order to prevent general searches, the 
Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant from a 
judge before conducting a search.28 A judge may issue a warrant only 
when there is probable cause to believe that what the police are 
looking for will be in the place to be searched.29  
 
B. The Particularity Requirement 
 
A warrant may be issued once probable cause has been 
established.30 However, the warrant must “particularly describe the 
things to be seized” so that “nothing is left to the discretion of the 
officer executing the warrant.”31 This particularity requirement 
ensures that the search will be narrowly tailored and “will not take
the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers 
intended to prohibit.”
 on 
                                                                                                                  
32 For example, the particularity requirement was 
not met when a magistrate issued a warrant only referencing a search 
for a “single dwelling [residence] . . . blue in color.”33 Although the 
police had probable cause to look for illegal weapons and explosives, 
 
are subject to a ‘broad range of [restrictions] that might infringe constitutional rights 
in a free society.’” (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002))). 
26 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971).  
27 Id. at 467 (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against general 
warrants that would authorize an “exploratory rummaging in a person’s 
belongings”).  
28 Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999). 
29 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). 
30 Id.  
31 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); see also Stanford v. 
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). 
32 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). 
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the language in the warrant “did not describe the items to be seized at 
all.”34 By failing to particularly describe the “place to be searched” or 
“the persons or things to be seized,”35 the warrant failed to meet the 
particularity requirement and was therefore unconstitutional.36   
While executing a warrant, a police officer may only search 
and seize items specified in the warrant.37 Again, a reasonableness 
standard is applied to determine whether the evidence seized was 
within the scope of the warrant.38 For example, “[i]f you are looking 
for an adult elephant, searching for it in a chest of drawers is not 
reasonable.”39 However, the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note 
provides a more realistic illustration.  There, the officer was authorized 
to search anywhere in the house where illegal drugs could reasonably 
be located.40 The officer could open and examine the freezer door, the 
desk drawer, a storage box, kitchen cabinets, and so on to attempt to 
find illegal drugs. But his search must remain within the bounds of 
reasonableness.41 For example, it might be unreasonable to search the 
defendant’s tax records if the warrant did not authorize a search for 
financial documents in connection with drug trafficking.42 
    
C. The Plain View Doctrine 
 
What if the officer opens a box in the basement while looking 
for drugs, but instead inadvertently discovers hundreds of photos of 
child pornography? The child pornography is clearly outside the scope 
of the search warrant. But since the criminality of the photos is so 
patently obvious, it would be illogical for the law to require the officer 
to ignore this incriminating evidence. In response, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
34 Id. (emphasis in original).  
35 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
36 Groh, 540 U.S. at 558.  
37 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980).  
38 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991); see also Platteville Area 
Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 1999). 
39 Platteville, 179 F.3d at 579.  
40 See Walter, 447 U.S. at 656.   
41 See id. 
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has carved out an exception to the general warrant requirement: 
officers are allowed to seize incriminating evidence in plain view even 
though outside the scope of the original warrant.43 Referred to as the 
plain view doctrine, this is an “exception to the general rule that 
warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.”44 
The plain view doctrine applies to situations where “the police 
have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the 
course of the search come across some other article of incriminating 
character.”45 The Supreme Court clarified the plain view doctrine in 
its 1990 Horton v. California decision.46 In Horton, the warra
authorized a search of the defendant’s house for the proceeds of a 
robbery, specifically three stolen rings.
nt 
                                                
47 While executing the search 
of the defendant’s residence, the police discovered numerous illegal 
weapons in plain view and seized them.48 The defendant challenged 
the admissibility of the weapons by arguing that they were seized 
outside the scope of the warrant.49  
The Supreme Court’s analysis focused on the relationship 
between individual privacy rights and lawful searches.50 The Court 
noted that when a warrant is executed, there are two types of rights 
that may be invaded. First, the search itself compromises a person’s 
privacy interests.51 Second, a seizure deprives a person of his or her 
property rights.52 The Court reasoned that when the police viewed the 
weapons, there was no additional or unauthorized privacy violation 
since the police were already lawfully present in the defendant’s house 
under the original warrant.53 Therefore, the plain view doctrine is best 
 
43 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990).  
44 Id. at 133.  
45 Id. at 135.  
46 See id. at 142.     
47 Id. at 130–31.  
48 Id. at 131.  
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 133.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.   
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viewed as an exception to the protection against illegal seizures.54 
However, the defendant’s property rights were not violated because he 
had no legal right to possess the weapons in the first place, and the 
illegality of the weapons became immediately apparent.55 Since a 
person’s privacy or property rights are not violated in these situations, 
the plain view doctrine comports with the Fourth Amendment.56   
The Supreme Court formulated three requirements for 
evidence to be admitted under the plain view doctrine. First, the 
officer must “be lawfully located in a place from which the object can 
be plainly seen.”57 Second, the officer must have a lawful right of 
access to the object.58 Third, the incriminating character of the item in 
plain view must be “immediately apparent.”59 If an item is seized 
when these three requirements are met, it is admissible because the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated.60  
Horton was decided in a pre-modern computer era and in the 
context of traditional physical evidence: guns, drugs, photos, physical 
documents, and so on.61 Computer technology as we know it today did 
not exist; it was relatively primitive and the internet was basically 
nonexistent.62 In fact, Horton was decided in 1990, the same year that 
marked the invention of HTML, a programming code that allowed the 
formation of our modern internet system known as the “world wide 
web.”63 The question before courts today is whether the pre-computer 
era plain view doctrine established in Horton should be applied to 
computer searches.   
 
                                                 
54 Id. at 133.  
55 Id. at 141–42.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 136–37. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987)).  
60 See id.  
61 See generally id. at 129–50. 
62 See generally Timeline of Computer History, THE COMPUTER HISTORY 
MUSEUM, http://computerhistory.org/timeline/?category=net (last visited Apr. 30, 
2010).  
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II. OUR DIGITAL LIVES 
 
Computers permeate nearly every aspect of American life.64 
This has created “an unimaginably vast amount of digital information 
which is getting vaster ever more rapidly.”65 And this expansion is not 
going to stop; in fact, the amount of digital information in the world is 
predicted to increase tenfold every five years.66  
Besides the vast sum of digital information that exists, people 
have created a digital life where formerly physical data have been 
converted into digital form.67 For example, “rather than storing 
images, movies, documents, correspondence, [or] personal records” in 
physical form, people instead store this information in digital media.68 
However, people are not merely converting files one-for-one from 
physical to digital.69 Computer technology has made it easier for 
people to create an unlimited number of files, images, and documents. 
For example, it is estimated that Facebook, a social networking 
website, stores approximately 40 billion user photos.70  
Additionally, computers often record information even if 
unintended by the user.71 For instance, Google records every e-mail 
sent on its Gmail electronic mail service, as well as any instant 
messaging communication through Gmail.72 Additionally, a user’s 
internet history is recorded on their computer hard drive, which creates 
a trail of what a person does on his or her computer.73 A lay computer 
                                                 
64 David J. S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of 
Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 
841 (2005).    
65 Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2010.   
66 Id.  
67 See RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to 
Digital Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 35 (2007).     
68 Id.  
69 See Data, Data Everywhere, supra note 65.  
70 Id.  
71 See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999); Russo v. 
State, 228 S.W.3d 779, 790 (Tex. App. 2007).   
72 See Gmail Privacy Notice, GMAIL, 
http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
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user might not even know these files exist. But with the proper 
software, law enforcement can view these files and know what 
websites a user has visited and what files on his or her computer have 
been created or opened.74  
Since criminals are likely to use computers for illegal activity, 
this digital information is a valuable source of evidence for law 
enforcement agencies.75 Today, search warrants frequently include 
language that authorizes the seizure of computers and other digital 
devices.76 However, as more information is stored in digital form, it 
has become increasingly difficult to separate innocuous files from 
incriminating files during the search of a computer.77  
In practice, criminals will hide, mislabel, and bury 
incriminating evidence among the thousands of innocuous files on a 
computer.78 This makes it extremely difficult and time-consuming for 
law enforcement to discover incriminating evidence.79 It is unlikely 
that a criminal will label files on his computer “child pornography,” 
“debts for illegal drugs,” or “incriminating contact list.”80 So in order 
to conduct an effective search, police must open almost every file on a 
computer.81 To assist, departments have employed sophisticated 
software that analyzes and categorizes this immense amount of data 
into a viewable, workable format.82  
                                                 
74 See id.   
75 Ziff, supra note 64, at 841.   
 76 E.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 515–16 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(warrant authorizing a search of “[a]ny and all computer systems and digital storage 
media”); see also United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(warrant authorizing a search of “video tapes, CD’s or other digital media, 
computers, and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other electronic media”). 
77 See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528–29 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
78 Id. at 528.   
79 See id.    
80 See id.; see also United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that “[c]riminals will do all they can to conceal contraband”).  
81 See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (holding that “[a]lthough care must be taken 
to minimize the intrusion, records searches require that many, and often all, 
documents in the targeted location be searched”).   
82 See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 2010); United States 
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 Federal and state courts across the United States are more 
frequently confronted with cases involving digital searches and 
seizures.83 Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the 
federal circuits have approached this situation differently. For 
example, the Tenth Circuit has held that a subjective intent standard 
should be applied when determining whether digital evidence is 
admissible.84 Further, the Ninth Circuit has advocated abandoning the 
plain view doctrine altogether in digital evidence cases, and instead 
has sought to adopt a multistep prophylactic approach to prevent 
overly broad computer searches.85 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, as 
well as the majority of other federal circuits, has continued to apply 
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine to digital evidence cases.86 
 The most prudent approach for courts to follow in future digital 
evidence cases is to adhere to traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
Courts should determine whether the search was reasonable, whether 
the evidence fell within the plain view doctrine, and whether the 
warrant met the particularity requirement. Computer searches raise 
significant privacy concerns, and courts should be aware of the 
differences between physical and digital evidence. However, it makes 
more sense to incrementally develop the contours of the plain view 
doctrine than to prematurely abandon it and develop a completely new 
test or framework. As more cases come before the courts, the contours 
of Fourth Amendment doctrine will incrementally develop so that 
individuals’ privacy and property rights will remain protected.    
 
 
                                                 
83 See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 514 (4th Cir. 2010); Mann, 592 
F.3d at 782; United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999); Gray, 78 
F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
84 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273. 
85 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 86 See generally Williams, 592 F.3d 511; Mann, 592 F.3d at 785; United States 
v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miranda, 325 Fed. 
App’x 858 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1999); 
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS’ APPROACHES TO  
DIGITAL EVIDENCE CASES 
 
 Although United States v. Mann is the focus of this Note, the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis heavily relies on two previous opinions 
from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. In order to understand the Mann 
decision and why the traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine is the 
proper standard for courts to follow, it is important to discuss the facts 
and analyses that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits applied to their 
respective digital evidence cases. 
 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Subjective Standard 
   
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit decided United States v. Carey, one 
of the first federal appeal level decisions to examine Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure doctrine in the context of digital 
evidence.87 The case stemmed from an at-home arrest of the defendant 
for the sale and possession of cocaine.88 The police observed a bong in 
plain view when they arrested Carey in his apartment.89 Carey then 
consented to a search of his apartment by signing a written consent 
form.90 The police discovered and seized illegal drugs as well as two 
computers believed to contain more evidence of drug trafficking.91 
After the computers were seized, a magistrate issued a warrant 
authorizing a search of both computers for “names, telephone 
numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence 
pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances.”92 The 
detective who conducted the search first manually inspected the 
computer and entered keyword searches such as “money, accounts, 
[or] people” to locate files with these types of filenames.93 However, 
                                                 
87 See 172 F.3d at 1273.  
88 Id. at 1270.  
89 Id. 
90 Id.   
91 Id.   
92 Id. (emphasis added).  
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this method did not uncover any files related to drugs.94 The detective 
continued to explore the directories and discovered hundreds of JPG 
image files—the first one he opened was child pornography.95 He then 
proceeded to save 240 JPG image files to nineteen disks and opened a 
sampling of five to seven images from each disk, most of which were 
child pornography.96  
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress all of the child 
pornography.97 During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the 
detective testified that once he discovered the first image of child 
pornography, he diverted from his original search for drug activity and 
began a second search for child pornography.98  
The defendant argued that the detective exceeded the scope of 
the warrant, which only authorized a search for “documentary 
evidence,” not image files.99 The government argued that the images 
were admissible because they were properly seized under the plain 
view doctrine.100  
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis noted that “[t]he essential inquiry 
when faced with challenges under the Fourth Amendment is whether 
the search or seizure was reasonable.”101 The warrant authorized a 
search of both computers for files with “names, telephone numbers, 
ledgers, receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence 
pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances.”102 The 
court narrowly interpreted the warrant’s language to only authorize a 
search for “documentary files,” such as Word, Excel, or Adobe PDF 
documents that would contain text-based information.103 Reasoning 
                                                 
94 Id.  
95 Id.   
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 1272.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. (quoting O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1472 (10th Cir. 
1989)).  
102 Id. at 1272–73 (emphasis added). 
103 See id.; United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009) 





Blake: Let's Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital A
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
that image files are not “documentary” in nature, the court held that 
the image files found in the defendant’s computer were not within the 
scope of the warrant.104 Therefore, the detective exceeded the scope of 
the warrant by downloading and opening the JPG images.105 And 
since the detective could not lawfully open or view any image files 
during his search, the child pornography did not satisfy the 
requirements of the plain vi 106ew doctrine.  
                                                
The Tenth Circuit also held that the detective should have 
known that the content of the image files was outside the scope of the 
warrant prior to opening them because “most featured a sexually 
suggestive title.”107 Further, even if the officer did not know the 
content of the first file, the detective should have known after opening 
it that the other files in the directory were likely to be child 
pornography as well.108 At this point, the detective should have 
stopped his search and obtained a second warrant to search for child 
pornography.109 There would have been probable cause for a second 
warrant based on the one known child pornography file, as well as the 
other sexually suggestive file names.110  
The court’s primary basis for holding the image files 
inadmissible rested on the detective’s own admission at the hearing.111 
The court found it “plainly evident [that] each time he opened a 
subsequent JPG file, he expected to find child pornography and not 
material related to drugs.”112 This departure marked the end point of 
the original search and constituted a second, unauthorized, and illegal 
search of the defendant’s computer.113 By exceeding the scope of the 
 
104 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272–73. 
105 Id.  
106 See id.; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (holding 
that the plain view doctrine requires that the officer must “be lawfully located in a 
place from which the object can be plainly seen”).  
107 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1274.  
108 Id.   
109 Id. at 1276 (Baldock, J., concurring).  
110 Id. at 1276–77. 
111 See id. at 1273 (majority opinion).  
112 Id.  
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warrant, the detective’s search was unreasonable, and any fruits of that 
search were inadmissible.114 
The Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that Carey did not involve 
the plain view doctrine.115 Instead, the court’s analysis centered on the 
subjective intent of the officer who admitted that he diverged from his 
original search and began a second search for more evidence of child 
pornography.116 In contrast, if the warrant had authorized a search for 
“image files” for evidence relating to drug trafficking, the court may 
have come to a different conclusion. Under this alternative scenario, 
the plain view doctrine would apply since the detective would be in a 
lawful position to open the image files, and the criminality of the child 
pornography would be immediately apparent.117  
Subsequent courts and scholars have interpreted Carey 
differently. The Carey decision goes to great lengths to state that its 
ruling was fact-specific and that it was not addressing the broad use of 
the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.118 Ten years after 
Carey, the Tenth Circuit highlighted its limitation in United States v. 
Burgess.119 In Burgess, a police detective was executing a search of 
the defendant’s computer for evidence related to illegal drug 
activity.120 The detective inadvertently discovered child pornography; 
however, he stopped his search after viewing the first image and 
obtained a second warrant to search for child pornography.121 He then 
renewed his search and discovered approximately 70,000 images of 
child pornography.122 The district court held that these images were 
properly seized and admissible.123  
                                                 
114 See id.   
115 Id. (“Although the question of what constitutes ‘plain view’ in the context of 
computer files is intriguing and appears to be an issue of first impression for this 
court, and many others, we do not need to reach it here.”).  
116 See id. at 1272–73.  
117 See id.; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990). 
118 See Carey, 172 F.3d. at 1273. 
119 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009).  
120 Id. at 1083–84.  
121 Id. at 1084.  
122 Id.  
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The Tenth Circuit distinguished the Carey and Burgess 
holdings on factual grounds. First, the officer in Burgess did not 
diverge from his original search and begin a second unauthorized 
search as the detective did in Carey.124 Second, the Burgess decision 
reiterated that Carey was fact-dependent and limited.125 Carey was an 
easily decided case because the subjective intent of the detective so 
clearly exceeded the scope of the warrant.126 However, this limits 
Carey’s application in cases where the subjective intent of the officer 
is not so clear.127 
Some legal scholars who advocate an abandonment of the plain 
view doctrine use Carey as a jumping-off point. For example, Orin 
Kerr of the George Washington University Law School argues that 
Carey adopts a new subjective standard when determining the 
reasonableness of a search.128 Kerr argues that this subjective 
approach “offers one significant advantage over the existing objectiv
test: it turns the emphasis from a question judges are poorly equipp
to answer (the reasonableness of a forensic step) to a question judges 





                                                
129 Kerr attempts
to discredit the knowledge, wisdom, and skill of all judges by arguin
that the process of computer searches is “too complex and fluid” for 
judges to grasp.130  
Nevertheless, a subjective standard raises several concerns that 
ultimately lead to its impracticability. First, any inquiry into the 
subjective intent of the executing officer goes directly against 
Supreme Court precedent.131 In Horton, the Supreme Court based this 
conclusion on practical concerns by noting, “evenhanded law 
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards 
of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state 
 
124 Id. at 1092.  
125 Id.  
126 See id.  
127 See id.  
128 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
531, 578 (2005); see also Chang, supra note 67, at 46–50. 
129 Kerr, supra note 128, at 578. 
130 See id.  
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of mind of the officer.”132 The scope of a search warrant is “defined 
by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable 
cause to believe that it may be found.”133 In the absence of any 
Supreme Court case law supporting a deviation from genera
Amendment precedent, courts should not adopt a new subjective intent 
standard in digital evidence cases.    
l Fourth 
                                                
Second, a subjective standard would induce testifying police 
officers to perjure themselves in order to admit improperly seized 
computer files. For evidence of this temptation, one needs to look no 
further than the Tenth Circuit’s United States v. Carey decision.134 
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Lewis at first 
stated that he knew the files likely contained child pornography.135 He 
knew he was exceeding the scope of the warrant, stating, “that 
question did arise, and my captain took care of [the issue] through the 
county attorney’s office.”136 After further questioning by the 
government, Detective Lewis later recanted his previous statement and 
asserted that he did not really know the contents of the JPG files 
before opening them.137 Although the judge rejected his later 
testimony, this example illustrates the perverse incentives that would 
confront testifying police officers if courts adopted a subjective intent 
standard.   
Just as the decision itself stated, Carey should be read 
narrowly.138 Although it can be argued that the Tenth Circuit had the 
opportunity to address the application of the plain view doctrine to 
digital evidence, the court chose not to.139 Instead, the Tenth Circuit 
applied a reasonableness standard to determine whether the detective’s 
 
132 Id.; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that 
“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis”). 
133 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).  
134 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1999).  
135 Id.  
136 Id.   
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 1276. 
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search comported with the protections of the Fourth Amendment, 
which it did not.140  
 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Prophylactic Test 
 
While the Tenth Circuit hinted at a slight divergence from 
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Ninth Circuit has directly 
abandoned it.141 In 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (“CDT”), a case concerning the 
highly-publicized seizure of computer files holding the steroid test 
results of Major League Baseball players.142  
The Major League Baseball Players Association (“the 
Players”) and Major League Baseball (“MLB”) had entered into an 
agreement where all players would be drug tested.143 Both sides 
agreed that the results would be strictly confidential and were intended 
only to allow the MLB to determine the degree of steroid use among 
athletes.144 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (“CDT”) administered, 
analyzed, and stored the test results.145  
The federal government suspected that the Bay Area Lab 
Cooperative (“Balco”) illegally distributed steroids to baseball 
players.146 The government established probable cause to seize the test 
results of ten players, and a magistrate issued a search warrant 
authorizing such seizure from CDT.147 Federal agents executed the 
warrant and seized not only the records of the ten players, but also 
reviewed the records of hundreds of other players who had been 
                                                 
140 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272.  
141 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 
1006–07 (9th Cir. 2009); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276.  
142 See 579 F.3d at 993.  
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 Id.  
146 Id.  
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tested.148 CDT and the Players moved to have the government return 
the test results that were improperly seized.149  
The Ninth Circuit analogized the facts in CDT to a previous 
Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Tamura.150 In Tamura, the 
government seized thousands of paper records relating to the 
defendant’s business.151 Instead of separating innocuous files from 
incriminating ones on site, the government seized all of the files and 
planned to later separate them.152 Tamura argued that the scope of the 
search was too broad and resulted in a wholesale seizure of documents 
not mentioned in the warrant.153 The government argued that this 
broad seizure was necessary because “the documents were 
intermingled and it was difficult to separate the described documents 
from the irrelevant ones” on site.154 The Ninth Circuit held a search is 
restricted to specifically enumerated items in the warrant.155 By 
seizing such a large amount of unrelated files, the government’s search 
and seizure was significantly intrusive and violated Fourth 
Amendment principles.156 The CDT court equated the wholesale 
seizure of business files in Tamura to the federal agents in CDT who 
                                                 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 993–94.  
150 Id. at 995–96. 
151 United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982).  
152 Id.  
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. (“As a general rule, in searches made pursuant to warrants only the 
specifically enumerated items may be seized.”). 
156 Id.; but see United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383–84 (6th Cir. 
1988) (holding that in the context of a computer search “it was inevitable that the 
officers would seize documents that were not relevant to the proceedings at hand. 
We do not think it is reasonable to have required the officers to sift though the large 
mass of documents and computer files found in the Hensons’ office, in an effort to 
segregate those few papers that were outside the warrant.”); United States v. Turner, 
13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1988) (“Often it is simply impractical to search a 
computer at the search site because of the time and expertise required to unlock all 





Blake: Let's Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital A
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
seizure from CDT of the test results of hundreds of players not 
authorized by the warrant.157   
Much of the court’s reasoning rested on the fact that “[t]he 
Government demonstrated a callous disregard for the rights of those 
persons whose records were seized and searched outside the 
warrant.”158 The warrant contained restrictions on how the seized data 
was to be handled; however, federal agents explicitly disregarded 
these limitations.159 For example, the warrant specified that neutral 
computer personnel, not investigating agents, were supposed to 
segregate relevant from irrelevant files.160 Nevertheless, the federal 
agents immediately made copies of all files and examined the test 
results themselves.161 At hearing, an Assistant United States Attorney 
even stated that a federal agent “briefly [perused the file] to see if 
there was anything above and beyond that which was authorized for 
seizure in the initial warrant.”162  
Instead of seeing the federal agents’ actions as a single act of 
malfeasance, the Ninth Circuit concluded “that such over-seizing is an 
inherent part of the electronic search process” and will become a more 
prevalent problem with digital evidence.163 In order to protect against 
this danger, the Ninth Circuit prescribed a five-part test that warrant-
issuing magistrates should follow in digital evidence cases: (1) 
reliance on the plain view doctrine must be waived in digital evidence 
cases; (2) an independent third party must review, segregate, and 
redact files before being given to investigators; (3) warrants must 
disclose the risks of destruction of information and prior efforts to 
seize that information; (4) the government’s search protocol must be 
designed to uncover only information for which it has probable cause; 
and (5) the government must either destroy or return evidence outside 
                                                 
157 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 997–
99 (9th Cir. 2009).  
158 Id. at 997.  
159 Id. at 995–97. 
160 Id. at 995–96.  
161 Id. at 996–97.  
162 Id. at 1010 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
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the scope of the warrant.164 The Ninth Circuit was reluctant to call this 
a test and instead offered it as a “useful tool for the future.”165 
However, at least one decision from the Northern District of California 
has treated the CDT test as the new Fourth Amendment standard to 
apply in the Ninth Circuit.166   
Although such a prophylactic approach may seem attractive, 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in CDT is overbroad and unnecessary, and 
it misinterprets the primary issue of the case. What distinguishes CDT 
from the other cases is the fact that the search was unlawful because of 
the overbroad and intrusive actions of the federal agents conducting 
it.167 The majority decision itself recognized that the seizure at issue 
was an “obvious case of deliberate overreaching by the government in 
an effort to seize data as to which it lacked probable cause.”168  
The Ninth Circuit could have concluded that the intrusive and 
illegal actions by the federal agents constituted a single event. Instead, 
the court broadly concluded that such “over-seizing is an inherent part 
of the electronic search process.”169 As discussed in Judge Callahan’s 
concurrence and dissent, “the majority’s prescriptions go significantly 
beyond what is necessary for it to resolve this case.”170 Judge Callahan 
argues that instead of casting traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine 
aside, “the prudent course would be to allow [its] contours . . . to 
develop incrementally through the normal course of fact-based case 
adjudication.”171 The Ninth Circuit would have reached the same 
result if it had applied traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine.172 The 
government’s seizure would have grossly exceeded the scope of the 
                                                 
164 Id.   
165 Id. at 1007.  
166 United States v. Cerna, No. CR 08-0730 WHA, 2009 WL 5125920, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Dec 21, 2009). 
167 See Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc,, 579 F.3d at 997.  
168 Id. at 1000.  
169 Id. at 1006. 
170 Id. at 1012 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
171 Id. at 1013. 
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warrant, the search would have been determined to be unreasonable, 
and the test results of the other players would have been suppressed.173  
In the short time since the CDT decision, criminal defendants 
have attempted to persuade other courts to follow this new standard.174 
However, most courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have been hesitant 
to adopt the prophylactic CDT test.175 The Seventh Circuit in United 
States v. Mann has been the only federal appellate court to address 
CDT to date, and it was skeptical of CDT’s overbroad approach.176 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit aligned its decision closer to Judge 
Callahan’s CDT dissent and sought to allow traditional Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to evolve in digital evidence cases.177 
Federal district and state courts have suggested that the CDT 
standard “creates more problems than it solves”178 and is only an 
optional, useful tool for the future.179 These courts instead focus on the 
specific facts in CDT that involved egregious conduct by government 
agents.180 Whereas most courts have viewed egregious police 
misconduct to be the exception, the Ninth Circuit appears to reason 
that police misconduct will be the rule in future digital evidence 
                                                 
173 See id. at 995–97 (majority opinion). This distinction is very similar to the 
Tenth Circuit’s Carey decision. Both Carey and CDT involved situations where the 
executing officers greatly exceeded the scope of the warrant, thereby making their 
searches unreasonable and providing grounds to suppress the evidence. The Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits adopted new frameworks for digital evidence cases, even though 
the divergence was unnecessary to resolve each case.    
174 See, e.g., United States v. Sedaghaty, Cr. No. 05-60008-HO, 2010 WL 
1490306, at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2010); United States v. Wilbur, No. CR09-191 MJP, 
2010 WL 519735, at *16 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2010); United States v. Kim, 677 F. 
Supp. 2d 930, 946 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
175 See id.  
176 See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2010). 
177 Id. at 785. The details of United States v. Mann will be discussed in further 
detail infra.  
178 United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 n.3 
(D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009) (arguing that the new standard is unnecessary because “the 
traditional sanction for police misconduct of this sort remains exclusion of 
evidence”). 
179 See United States v. King, CR No. 09-00207 DAE, 2010 WL 727981, at *25 
(D. Haw. Mar. 1, 2010). 
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cases.181 Under this line of thinking, CDT’s expansive pre-issuance 
procedures are justified. However, it is extremely pessimistic to 
assume that all law enforcement officials will be as overzealous as the 
federal agents in CDT when conducting a digital search.182  
Besides, there are existing remedies within the law that deter 
law enforcement from exceeding the scope of a warrant or otherwise 
acting unlawfully. First, the exclusionary rule deters officers from 
acting unlawfully while executing a warrant.183 The exclusionary rule 
prohibits the admission of any evidence at trial that was obtained from 
an illegal search or seizure.184 This rule incentivizes police officers to 
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law since police 
officers presumably want seized evidence to be admitted in court.185 
Second, if the exclusionary rule does not deter an officer, there is a 
civil remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983186 for police violations 
of constitutional rights.187 § 1983 provides redress to any citizen 
whose constitutional rights are violated by any person acting under 
color of law.188 Therefore, a citizen would have a meritorious § 1983 
suit if a police officer violated her Fourth Amendment rights by 
conducting an unreasonable search and seizure.189 These two existing 
                                                 
181 See id.  
182 See id. (“There is no evidence that police disobedience of search warrant 
limitations is so widespread to compel such onerous pre-issuance procedures, and at 
the very least the more traditional remedies should be tried first.”). 
183 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (holding the purpose 
of the exclusionary rule is “to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty . . . by removing the incentive to disregard it”).  
184 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920).  
185 See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.  
186 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”).  
187 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006).  
188 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).  
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remedies provide sufficient protection to individuals from the 
unreasonable or overzealous searches over which the Ninth Circuit 
was concerned  in CDT, thereby making the prophylactic measures 
overbroad and unnecessary.190  
The Ninth Circuit was presented with a factual scenario where 
the federal agents’ actions were clearly egregious and exceeded the 
scope of the warrant.191 That in and of itself is enough to suppress the 
test results because it constituted an unreasonable search.192 Instead of 
issuing a narrow ruling, the Ninth Circuit adopted an overly broad 
approach in an attempt to prevent future police misconduct.193 The 
proper approach would have been to rely on the traditional Fourth 
Amendment principles of reasonableness, the particularity 
requirement, and the plain view doctrine. Although digital evidence 
cases present new issues and problems, the contours of these doctrines 
should be allowed to develop incrementally as different factual 
scenarios come before courts.  
 
C. The Seventh Circuit Weighs In: United States v. Mann 
 
 On January 20, 2010, the Seventh Circuit weighed in on this 
issue in United States v. Mann.194 The Mann decision shares many 
similarities with the hypothetical situation posed in the introduction of 
this Note. However, the facts of Mann require further development 
because of certain significant differences. In 2007, Matthew Mann 
worked as a lifeguard instructor for the Red Cross in Tippecanoe 
County, Indiana.195 He installed a video camera in the women’s locker 
room in order to record women changing their clothes.196 However, in 
addition to videotaping women in the locker room, he recorded 
                                                 
190 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006 
(9th Cir. 2009).  
191 See id. at 997.  
192 See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). 
193 See Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 1006.  
194 592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010). 
195 Id. at 780. 
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himself installing the camera.197 One of his female students discovered 
the camera, played the tape for herself, and recognized Mann.198 She 
contacted the police department and turned over the video camera and 
videotape.199  
 Days later, the police obtained a warrant authorizing a search 
of Mann’s residence for “video tapes, CD’s or other digital media, 
computers, and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other 
electronic media, to search for images of women in locker rooms or 
other private areas.”200 The police executed the warrant and seized two 
desktop computers, a laptop, and an external hard drive.201 The next 
day, Mann was arrested for voyeurism in violation of Indiana law.202  
 Two months later, a police detective conducted a search of 
Mann’s computers.203 He began by creating an exact copy of the 
computer hard drives in order to prevent the data from being altered or 
destroyed.204 The detective searched the content of the hard drives 
using a software program, known as a “forensic tool kit” (FTK).205 
The FTK software examines every file on the computer and then 
displays an overview screen with thumbnail images of every image, 
video, and document on the computer.206  
The FTK software also flags computer files using a “KFF 
Alert,” or Known File Filter.207 The software cross-references all 
filenames on the computer with a national registry consisting of illegal 
files previously seized by other law enforcement agencies.208 Any 




200 Id. at 780–81.   
201 Id. at 781. 
202 Id.; see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-5(a)(2)(b)(1) (2004).  





208 Id. The original warrant authorized the detective to search the computer for 
any files that might contain voyeurism. At the very least, this authorized the 
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matches are flagged with a “KFF Alert.”209 Most files from the 
national directory are child pornography.210  
While searching Mann’s computers, the detective discovered 
photos of girls taken from a high school locker room, child 
pornography, and a story about a swim coach masturbating while 
watching young girls swim, possibly written by Mann.211 No files 
were flagged by the KFF Alert during this first search.212  
 Two months after the first search,213 the detective searched 
Mann’s external hard drive using the same software program.214 Four 
files on the hard drive were flagged with a KFF Alert, indicating that 
the files were likely child pornography.215 The detective opened every 
file on the hard drive, including the four KFF Alert files, which were 
indeed child pornography.216 He also found two more videos from a 
high school locker room.217 
 Mann moved to suppress the child pornography by arguing that 
the detective exceeded the scope of the warrant, but the district court 
                                                                                                                   
go beyond what the officer could do with his own eyes. Therefore, the KFF Alert 
does not create an additional second search for Fourth Amendment purposes.  
209 Id.  
210 Id.  
211 Id.  
212 Id.  
213 Id. at 781. The Seventh Circuit commented that it was “problematic that 
nearly two months elapsed before Detective Huff began his search of the Western 
Digital hard drive despite having found child pornography on the Dell laptop.” Id. at 
786. The court was reluctant to specify a proper time frame and only alluded to a 
potential constitutional violation at some point. See id. Other courts ruling on this 
specific issue have given police departments great flexibility due to practical 
considerations, such as time constraints and limited resources. The determining 
factor has been whether the police officers were acting in good faith to stay within 
the boundaries of the warrant. See generally United States v. Syphers, 296 F. Supp. 
2d 50, 59 (D. N.H. 2003); United States v. Yung, 786 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (D. Kan. 
1992); but see United States v. Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D. Me. 1999) 
(holding that a search was unlawful when it was executed sixty-two days after the 
seizure of the computer and the warrant was only valid for sixty days). 
214 Mann, 592 F.3d at 781.  
215 Id. 
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denied his motion.218 The court reasoned that the warrant authorized 
the detective to examine any files on the computer that may have 
involved voyeurism, and that the detective never abandoned his search 
for voyeurism when he inadvertently discovered the child 
pornography.219 Although outside the scope of the warrant, the district 
court held that the child pornography was admissible under the plain 
view doctrine.220 Mann then entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of possession of child pornography and appealed the district 
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.221  
 Mann’s appeal rested on three arguments. First, Mann argued 
that by utilizing the FTK software, the detective’s search was 
unreasonable because it exceeded the scope of the warrant.222 Mann 
interpreted the warrant to be restrictive—only authorizing a search for 
“images of women in locker rooms and other private places.”223 Mann 
argues that he was subjected to a general search since every file on his 
computer was examined by the software.224 The Seventh Circuit 
rejected this argument based on practical concerns, reasoning that 
these types of software programs are essential tools for law 
enforcement since digital files “could be nearly anywhere on the 
computers.”225 The court distinguished physical searches from digital 
searches by noting, “[u]nlike a physical object that can be immediately 
identified as responsive to the warrant or not, computer files may be 
manipulated to hide their true contents.”226 Therefore the court held 
that it was reasonable for the detective to both use the FTK software 
program and briefly examine all files on the computer in order to 
determine their contents.227   
                                                 
218 Id. at 781–82.  
219 Id. 
220 See id. at 782. 
221 Id.  
222 Id.   
223 Id.  
224 See id.  
225 Id.   
226 Id.  
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 Second, relying on the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in 
United States v. Carey, Mann argued that the detective turned the 
specific search into a general search by looking for evidence of crimes 
unrelated to voyeurism.228 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument 
because it distinguished the facts in Mann from those in Carey.229 
First, the warrant in Carey only authorized a search for documentary 
evidence (i.e., Word or Excel documents), but the detective unlawfully 
extended his search by opening image files.230 In contrast, the Mann 
warrant authorized the detective to examine any image file that may 
have been related to voyeurism.231 Therefore, the search was 
reasonable because the detective in Mann opened files within the 
scope of the warrant.232  
The Carey and Mann facts can be further distinguished by 
scrutinizing the subjective intent of the officer executing the 
warrant.233 The officer in Carey admitted that after he discovered the 
first image of child pornography, he diverged from his original search 
for evidence of drug dealing.234 The officer’s second, unauthorized 
search for child pornography exceeded the scope of the warrant and 
was therefore unreasonable.235 In contrast, the detective in Mann 
testified that he “continued to look for items with voyeurism” and only 
made notations where he inadvertently discovered child 
                                                 
228 Id. at 783.  
229 Id. at 783–85. 
230 Id. at 783.  
231 Id. The warrant authorized a search for “video tapes, CD’s or other digital 
media, computers, and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other electronic 
media, to search for images of women in locker rooms or other private areas.” Id. at 
780–81.   
232 Id. at 783–84.   
233 Id. at 784. The Supreme Court has held that the subjective intent of the 
executing officer is irrelevant in determining whether the search was reasonable. See 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding “[s]ubjective intentions 
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”). Despite this, 
the Seventh Circuit used this factual difference to further distinguish the Mann 
decision since Carey so heavily relied on subjective intent in reaching its holding.  
234 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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pornography.236 The Seventh Circuit held that his search was 
reasonable since he never abandoned his search for evidence of 
voyeurism.237    
Mann’s third argument urged the Seventh Circuit to adopt the 
prophylactic rules advocated by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.238 The Seventh Circuit rejected this 
preventative approach because it was overbroad.239 The Seventh 
Circuit recognized that “there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s case 
law (or the Ninth Circuit’s for that matter) counseling the complete 
abandonment of the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.”240 
Instead, the proper approach “would be to allow the contours of the 
plain view doctrine to develop incrementally through the normal 
course of fact-based case adjudication.”241 The court saw the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach as diverging from Fourth Amendment precedent, 
when there is no indication or need to do so.242 
The Seventh Circuit based its holding on the traditional 
principles of Fourth Amendment analysis.  First, the court held that 
warrants must “describe with particularity the things to be seized and 
that searches are narrowly tailored to uncover only those things 
described.”243 The Mann court did not abandon the plain view doctrine 
and emphasized that reasonableness is the most appropriate standard 
to apply when determining whether a search violated the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment.244  
Applying a reasonableness standard, the court affirmed the 
district court’s ruling with one exception.245 The Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
236 Mann, 592 F.3d at 784.  
237 See id.  
238 Id. at 785. 
239 Id. (citing United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 
1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
240 Id.  
241 Id. (citing Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1013 (Callahan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).    
242 See id.  
243 Id. at 786.  
244 Id. at 785–86.  
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reversed the district court’s ruling with respect to the four images 
flagged by the KFF Alert, holding them inadmissible.246 The court 
reasoned that the detective knew or should have known that any file 
tagged by the KFF Alert was likely child pornography, which was 
material outside the scope of the warrant.247 By opening the files, the 
detective exceeded the scope of the original warrant that only 
authorized a “search for images of women in locker rooms or other 
private areas.”248 Besides these four images, the court held that the 
detective’s actions “were reasonable and within the scope of the 
warrant’s authorization.”249 
The Seventh Circuit reached the correct conclusion in Mann 
because it adhered to the principles of Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure doctrine. It ultimately rested its conclusion on whether the 
search was reasonable. The warrant authorized the officer to search for 
evidence of voyeurism, which meant he could open image files. In 
turn, any image he opened that turned out to be child pornography fell 
within the plain view doctrine. But the Seventh Circuit correctly 
distinguished the images tagged with a KFF Alert by reasoning that 
the officer should have known those images were likely child 
pornography. The facts of Mann were relatively straightforward; 
however, many different factual scenarios have come before other 
courts, and understanding these distinctions is important to fully grasp 
Fourth Amendment doctrine in the digital age.   
 
IV. THE REASONABLE APPROACH: COMMON FACT PATTERNS TO GUIDE 
FUTURE COURTS 
  
Besides the Seventh Circuit, the majority of other federal 
circuit courts that have addressed this issue continue to apply 
                                                 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 784.  
248 Id. at 781.  
249 Id. at 786 (citing United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 
2006) (a computer search may be “as extensive as reasonably required to locate the 
items described in the warrant” (quoting United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 
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traditional Fourth Amendment principles: a reasonableness standard, 
the particularity requirement, and the plain view doctrine.250 Today’s 
Fourth Amendment doctrine is the result of decades of continuously 
evolving court precedent. Digital evidence and computers should not 
cast doubt on this well-developed legal doctrine. Instead, it should be 
viewed as a continuation of the evolving common law. 
As more digital evidence cases come before courts, the 
contours of the Fourth Amendment and digital evidence will become 
more apparent. Several common fact patterns have emerged, not all of 
which were implicated in United States v. Mann,251 United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,252 or United States v. Carey.253 
These patterns will now be categorized and examined in order to 
provide a usable framework for future courts.  
 
A. The Particularity Requirement 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants that 
authorize “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”254 
Instead, the Constitution requires that a warrant “particularly 
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”255 Referred to as the particularity requirement, a warrant must 
“identif[y] the items to be seized by their relation to designated 
crimes” and must “leave[] nothing to the discretion of the officer 
executing the warrant.”256  
                                                 
250 See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 514 (4th Cir. 2010); Mann, 
592 F.3d at 782; United States v. Miranda, 325 Fed. Appx. 858, 860 (11th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 88–89 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 
1374, 1382 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (E.D. Va. 
1999). 
251 See 592 F.3d at 780–82. 
252 See 579 F.3d 989, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2009). 
253 See 172 F.3d 1268, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 1999). 
254 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).  
255 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
256 United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 
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Due to the vast amount of information that can be stored on a 
computer, the particularity requirement is becoming increasingly 
important in digital evidence cases.257 Therefore, “warrants for 
computer searches must affirmatively limit the search to evidence of 
specific federal crimes or specific types of material.”258 In other 
words, a warrant cannot authorize a search of an individual’s entire 
computer, where a police officer can “search from one object to 
another until something incriminating at last emerges.”259 
Nevertheless, the degree of specificity required is flexible, depends on 
the individual circumstances of each case, and “will vary depending 
on the crime involved and the types of items sought.”260 Limiting the 
search to certain file types or crimes is important, but the warrant 
cannot be required to be so specific as to be a “constitutional strait 
jacket” on the executing officer.261  
Magistrates are frequently confronted with a situation where 
prior to the actual search, the officers do not know exactly what type 
of computer devices an individual has in his possession.262 As a result, 
warrants often broadly describe the type of physical devices to be 
searched and seized.263 In order for the warrant to meet the 
particularity requirement, the generality regarding the physical units to 
be seized needs to be counterbalanced with limitations on the specific 
content to be searched for within the computer.264  
                                                 
257 See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005).  
258 Id. (emphasis added).   
259 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).  
260 United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988); see also 
United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the generic 
classification in the language of the warrant was acceptable since “no more specific 
description of the computer equipment sought was possible”).  
261 United States v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2009).  
262 E.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 520–21 (4th Cir. 2010); 
Henson, 848 F.2d at 1382–83.  
263 See generally United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(warrant authorizing search for “video tapes, CD’s or other digital media, computers, 
and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other electronic media”); United States 
v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2009) (authorizing a search of “computer 
records”). 
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An illustration of a warrant meeting the particularity 
requirement in the digital context is the Ninth Circuit’s United States 
v. Burgess.265 The warrant in Burgess authorized a search for 
“computer records” that “would tend to show conspiracy to sell drugs, 
including pay-owe sheets, address books, rolodexes, pagers, firearms 
and monies.”266 The Ninth Circuit held that the warrant was not overly 
broad since it “‘contained sufficiently particularized language’ 
creating ‘a nexus’ with the crime to be investigated.”267  
In contrast, United States v. Otero provides an example of an 
overly broad warrant that did not meet the particularity requirement.268 
The police suspected that Otero, a postal worker, was stealing letters 
from credit card companies that were supposed to be delivered on his 
route.269 After planting two test letters that failed to be delivered, the 
police executed a warrant to search Otero’s house.270 The warrant 
authorized a search for “any and all information and/or data stored . . . 
on computer media . . .”271 The warrant did not limit the search to 
certain computer file types (i.e., Word documents, PDF files, or image 
files), nor did it limit the specific content to be searched (i.e., evidence 
of mail or credit card fraud).272 The Tenth Circuit held that the warrant 
failed to describe the items to be seized with “technical precision [or] 
practical accuracy, and it therefore lack[ed] sufficient particularity.”273  
                                                 
265 576 F.3d at 1091 
266 Id. at 1083.  
267 Id. at 1091 (citing in part United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1271 
(10th Cir. 2006); see also Mann, 592 F.3d 780–81 (warrant authorizing a search of 
computers only for “images of women in locker rooms or other private areas”); 
United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999).  
268 563 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 2009).  
269 Id. at 1129.  
270 Id.  
271 Id. at 1130. 
272 See id.  
273 Id. at 1132; see also United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir. 
2005) (holding that a search was invalid because it did not limit the search to any 
particular files or any particular federal crime. “The warrant thus permitted the 
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A warrant must be as specific as the circumstances allow.274 If 
a warrant authorizes the seizure of any computer device and search for 
any incriminating evidence, a court will likely hold any file found 
pursuant to the warrant to be inadmissible.275 Instead, a warrant must 
affirmatively state either (1) the type of documents to be searched for 
(documents, images, videos, etc.) or (2) the type of content to be 
searched for (financial data, pornographic images, drug activity, 
etc.).276 The more specific a warrant, the more likely computer files 
seized pursuant to that warrant will be held admissible in court.  
 
B.  Common Fact Patterns under the Plain View Doctrine 
 
There are many factual scenarios that may arise when an 
officer is searching a computer. These factual complexities make it 
difficult to craft a clear, black-and-white rule for digital evidence 
cases. Below are summaries of common factual scenarios and 
illustrations of how courts have determined whether digital evidence 
fell within the plain view doctrine. By understanding how the plain 
view doctrine has been applied so far, future courts will be able to 
better understand how to decide new and complex issues that will arise 
in future digital evidence cases.   
 
1. Was the officer looking for the same types of files listed in the 
warrant? 
 
 To meet the particularity requirement, a warrant must 
affirmatively state either the type of files or specific content to be 
searched for.277 In practice, it is very difficult for an officer to tightly 
restrict his search but still conduct a thorough investigation.278 As 
several courts readily point out, it is very unlikely for a criminal to 
                                                 
274 United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988).  
275 See Otero, 563 F.3d at 1132.   
276 See Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 862.   
277 Id.   
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label or organize computer files so their criminality is readily 
apparent.279  
 There are a number of ways to manipulate computer files to 
disguise their illegal nature. The easiest way is to use a deceptive file 
name.280 Few criminals “keep documents of their criminal transactions 
in a folder marked ‘criminal records.’”281 If an individual has a Word 
document with the recipe for manufacturing methamphetamine, he can 
disguise this file’s true nature by naming it anything other than “meth 
stuff.”282 File names for images can be even more deceptive. 
Computers will often automatically name an image file with a 
seemingly random file name—for example, “Img_5777_875.jpg” or 
“DC001352.jpg.”283 These types of file names give no indication of 
the file’s content, so an officer must open each file in order to see what 
the file actually contains.284  
A second way to hide incriminating evidence is to change the 
file extension type. There are dozens of different file types.285 By 
modifying a file’s extension, an individual can conceal the true file 
type and even prevent the file from being opened.286 For example, if a 
file was created as a Microsoft Word document (.doc) and is 
subsequently changed to an Adobe file (.pdf), the file will be 
unreadable and cannot be opened.287 Some software programs used by 
                                                 
279 See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Images can be 
hidden in all manner of files, even word processing documents and spreadsheets. 
Criminals will do all they can to conceal contraband, including the simple expedient 
of changing the names and extensions of files to disguise their content from the 
casual observer.”); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(holding a criminal will “often intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to bury 
incriminating files within innocuously named directories”). 
280 See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 528.  
281 Id.  
282 See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009).  
283 See id. at 1093–94.  
284 See id.  
285 See id. at 1093 (e.g., .txt, .doc, .docx, and .dot for Microsoft Word; .wpt, 
.wpk, and .wpd for WordPerfect; .pdf for Adobe; .xls, .xlsb, and .xltx for Microsoft 
Excel; or.jpg and .gif for images). 
286 Kerr, supra note 128, at 545.   
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police can detect these unreadable files and determine the correct file 
extension. The lesson, however, is the same: officers cannot limit their 
searches to certain file types.288 
 The third common way to conceal incriminating documents is 
to hide incriminating files among innocuous files.289 By burying 
incriminating files among dozens or even hundreds of unrelated, 
noncriminal files, law enforcement has much more difficulty locating 
the types of files authorized for search and seizure by the warrant.290  
Although a warrant must state the types of files or content to be 
searched for, “[i]t is unrealistic to expect a warrant to prospectively 
restrict the scope of a search by [a specific] directory, filename or 
extension.”291 This does not mean that officers can look at every 
single file on a computer. Instead, the officer should “look in the
obvious places . . . But in the end, there may be no practical substitute 
for actually looking in many (perhaps all) folders and sometimes at the 
documents contained within those folders.”
 most 
                                                
292  
 In sum, it is unrealistic to expect a magistrate to be able to 
prospectively limit a search to certain file types or names since law 
enforcement personnel rarely know what information they are going to 
find on a computer. When an officer begins his search, he should look 
in the most obvious places—either by using a keyword search or 
manually searching the computer for files whose names indicate that 
they are within the scope of the warrant. If this initial inquiry uncovers 
nothing, then the officer can broaden his search by cursorily looking at 
all files on the computer to determine whether the content is relevant 





288 See id.  
289 United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(“[C]omputer hackers often intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to bury 
incriminating files within innocuously named directories.”). 
290 See id.  
291 United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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2. Did the officer open the files cursorily? 
 
 Since the content of computer files can be so easily disguised, 
an officer executing a warrant must often open each file to determine 
whether its falls within the scope of the warrant.293 Some defendants 
have argued that this essentially turns every computer search into a 
general search.294 However, having to cursorily open computer files 
can be equated with traditional physical evidence seizures, where 
cursorily examining files is acceptable.  
The Supreme Court has held that when searching through large 
files of business documents, “it is certain that some innocuous 
documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine 
whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be 
seized.”295 For example, the Fourth Circuit held that officers acted 
lawfully when they briefly read a letter found in the defendant’s 
apartment that detailed a recipe for making methamphetamine.296 
Since the letters were within plain view, the court held that “some 
perusal, generally fairly brief, of the documents was clearly necessary 
in order for the police to perceive the relevance of the document to 
crime.”297 After briefly reading the documents, their incriminating 
nature became immediately apparent and subject to seizure under the 
plain view doctrine.298  
Just like searching through physical documents, an officer 
searching through hundreds or thousands of computer files must 
cursorily open each document to determine its content.299 If the file’s 
criminality becomes immediately apparent after opening it, then the 
file may be lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine.300 For 
example, in United States v. Gray, the Northern District of Virginia 
                                                 
293 See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521–22 (4th Cir. 2010)  
294 See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (10th Cir. 1999).    
295 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).  
296 United States v. Crouch, 648 F.2d 932, 933 (4th Cir. 1981). 
297 Id. (quoting United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1257 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
298 Id. at 934.  
299 See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521–22 (4th Cir. 2010).   
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held that an officer could open computer records to determine the 
computer’s content.301 An FBI agent was executing a search for 
evidence of unauthorized government computer intrusions.302 He 
utilized a software program that created a directory of the computer 
files, and he followed FBI protocol by opening and looking “briefly at 
each of the files contained in the directories.”303 The agent discovered 
child pornography in a folder titled “Tiny Teen.”304 The court, 
however, held that his search of the folder was a lawful continuation 
of his original search.305 The FBI agent testified that he “knew from 
his experience that computer hackers often intentionally mislabel files, 
or attempt to bury incriminating files within innocuously named 
directories.”306 It was improper to limit computer searches to certain 
file names because “the designation or labeling of files on a computer 
can easily be manipulated to hide their substance.”307 
This position is supported by practical considerations. If police 
could examine only files with certain names or file types, criminals 
would have an obvious advantage over law enforcement. This standard 
would induce every criminal, knowing that the police’s hands are so 
tightly tied behind their backs, to label incriminating computer files 
with innocuous names and bury the files among innocent content. This 
would be a perverse result because it would make law enforcement 
efforts more difficult and would reduce the likelihood that someone 
will be arrested for illegal activity.  
An analogy of this impracticable standard to physical evidence 
would be a rule that precluded police from seizing a bag containing a 
powdery white substance if it is labeled “flour” or “talcum powder.”308 
In order to determine the contents, the powdery substance must be 
tested.309 Similarly, a computer file must be cursorily examined in 
                                                 
301 United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999).  
302 Id. at 526.  
303 Id.  
304 Id. at 527. 
305 Id. at 530.  
306 Id. at 529. 
307 United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010).  
308 Ziff, supra note 64, at 864.  
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order to determine its content. The principles relating to physical 
searches should be extended to digital searches in order to allow police 
to conduct a thorough and effective computer search.   
 
3. After uncovering material outside the scope of the warrant, did the 
officer stop his search and get a second warrant for the newly 
discovered evidence? 
 
Although officers can cursorily open documents on a 
computer, what the officer does after discovering incriminating files 
outside the scope of the warrant becomes important. Some courts have 
held that the officer must stop his search and obtain a second warrant 
for the newly discovered incriminating evidence.310 Indeed, this is the 
most prudent course of action an officer can take when he uncovers 
evidence outside the scope of the warrant.  
For example, in United States v. Burgess, when the officer 
discovered child pornography that was outside the scope of the 
warrant, he immediately stopped his search and obtained a second 
warrant to search for the child pornography.311 The Tenth Circuit held 
that the first image the officer viewed was admissible under the plain 
view doctrine.312 But the officer did not exceed the scope of the 
warrant because he immediately stopped his search and did not renew 
it until he received a second warrant.313 The first image established 
probable cause for the second warrant, and the images later discovered 
under the second warrant were admissible.314 The court did note that 
had the first image had a filename “strongly suggesting pornography,” 
the officer could not have legally opened the file since he would have 
had reason to know that its content was outside the scope of the 
                                                 
310 See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009); Gray, 
78 F. Supp. at 527–28 (E.D. Va. 1999).   
311576 F.3d at 1092; see also Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 527–28 (holding that 
child pornography was admissible because the officer obtained a second warrant 
after inadvertently discovering child pornography).    
312 See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1092.  
313 Id. at 1094–95.  
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warrant.315 The officer would have had probable cause, but would 
have had to secure a second warrant before proceeding.316  
  
4. If clear, what were the subjective intentions of the officer? 
 
 Courts should consider the subjective intent of the officer when 
their intent is clear. For example, the detective in United States v. 
Carey admitted to stopping his original search and beginning a second 
search for child pornography.317 The subjective intent of the officer 
clearly indicated that his search was outside the scope of the 
warrant.318  
 However, a subjective intent analysis should be restricted to 
situations where the intent of the officer is clear and he admits to 
starting a second, unauthorized search. As discussed previously, there 
is an incentive for police officers to testify that their search did not go 
beyond the scope of the warrant.319 However, if an officer admits in 
court that he intended to go beyond the scope of the warrant, that 
evidence is relevant in determining whether the seized evidence 




 The traditional principles of Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure doctrine—reasonableness, the particularity requirement, and 
the plain view doctrine—should continue to be the standard that courts 
apply in both physical and digital evidence cases. Established in a pre-
computer era, these principles should be allowed to gradually evolve 
into the realm of digital evidence. Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
                                                 
315 Id. at 1095.  
316 Id.  
317 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the federal agent exceeded the scope of the warrant because he intentionally 
“peruse[d the file] to see if there was anything above and beyond that which was 
authorized for seizure in the initial warrant”).  
318 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273.  
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have departed from this sound precedent prematurely and have crafted 
alternative approaches that either go against Supreme Court precedent 
or create as many problems as they solve. The Seventh Circuit, in 
United States v. Mann, reached the correct conclusion and properly 
applied court precedent. The prevalence of computers in American 
society and the higher potential for privacy invasions is a concern of 
which courts should take note. However, the prudent and correct 
approach for future courts is to abide by settled court precedent and 
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